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  Efficient trade requires reliable enforcement of the agreements governing the exchange. The 
institutional underpinnings of trade have been addressed by game-theoretic analyses of the 
motivation of individual traders to help enforce trade agreements.1 We complement this research 
by comparing the implications of different institutional settings for the entire set of traders, 
differentiated by their exposure to contract violations and their bargaining power when it occurs. 
The extremes of institutional development are:  
(a) anarchy, where prior agreements cannot be enforced and disputes are settled according to the 
balance of coercive power, given the default options of the disputants; 
(b) the rule of law, where prior agreements are enforced by an objective authority, insulated from 
local power holders, whose procedures disputants acknowledge to be legitimate.  
The side that fears that it would be weaker in anarchic bargaining would appear likely to support 
the rule of law. We make this intuition precise and consider when the rule of law would be 
supported by the stronger side, even if confident of their strength. 
  Sections 1-3 develop a model of trade under the rule of law and under anarchy. Our analysis 
starts from the trading costs that a trader incurs to position himself to make an exchange, for 
example, the maritime merchant￿s costs of buying a ship and paying sailors. Agreements reached 
before these trading costs were incurred would be upheld by the rule of law. In its absence, 
trading costs that are sunk by the time the exchange takes place expose a trader to ￿holdup￿ by a 
counter-party seeking to extract better terms. Suppose that a seller can extract very favourable 
terms from a buyer in anarchic negotiations, e.g., because the seller has a better default option or 
can better tolerate protracted bargaining. Then few buyers would incur trading costs to come to 
any exchange meeting, so sellers who have incurred trading costs have only a low probability of 
meeting a buyer, other sellers having meantime been attracted by the favourable terms that each 
could extract in bilateral bargaining. By crowding into the market in pursuit of the benefits of 
anarchic holdup, rival sellers dissipate these benefits by reducing each other’s probability of 
                                                 
1   Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990), Grief (1992, 1993), Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994).   
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selling, i.e., they exert a negative externality on each other. In these circumstances, all sellers 
might be better off if they jointly bind themselves from holding up individual buyers, thereby 
eliminating the excess supply. This could be achieved by extending the protection of a legal 
system impartially to buyers.  
  Section 4 develops a restriction on the distribution of trading costs across traders which is 
necessary and sufficient to ensure that all traders prefer the rule of law to anarchy, whatever the 
balance of bargaining power in anarchic trade. This restriction is not onerous, suggesting that in 
broad historical circumstances, the gains from trade would motivate support for the rule of law, 
even from the powerful. Indeed, the development of the rule of law within a jurisdiction might be 
driven, in part, by its appeal to foreigners who offer novel gains from trade but have little access 
to the local power structure. Thus, trade which is international has long been important for 
Europe, given its diverse geography and political fragmentation. This could help explain the early 
development within European jurisdictions of the rule of law. By contrast, trade with foreigners 
was of little importance to classical China, which comprised an equally diverse area, but usually 
enjoyed a unified jurisdiction. Facing few of the imperatives of international trade, China￿s high 
level of order was achieved via an efficient, all-encompassing bureaucracy rather than via the 
application of rules by a judicial system independent of the power structure. Only in the last two 
decades have there been significant attempts to institute the rule of law within China ￿ as it 
seeks to foster international commerce and investment.  
  Even given the economic pre-conditions for broad support for the rule of law, the requisite 
public institutions and social attitudes could take a long time to develop. This leaves room for 
private institutions to emerge more quickly to garner the gains from trade. European history 
records an array of monopolistic trading institutions, such as guilds and coalitions of merchant 
adventurers. As noted in Sections 5 and 6 respectively, a monopolistic middleman or a trading 
coalition can facilitate trade by (i) internalizing the negative externalities that its atomistic 
counterparts would have exerted on each other by crowding into the market in pursuit of the 
benefits of anarchic holdup; (ii) having a long-term corporate identity and interests, so that it can  
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make a credible commitment to refrain from holding up atomistic traders. The sunk costs of 
setting up a monopoly could serve as such a commitment; a government anxious to facilitate 
trade could sanction the monopoly and thereby lower its setup costs while constraining holdup by 
threatening to withdraw government sanction. Section 7 points out that a trading coalition might 
also seek to overcome counterparties￿ fear of holdup by supporting their formation of a 
countervailing trading coalition, a possible interpretation of the actions of the East India 
Companies.  
  Our analysis highlights another pitfall in the path toward the rule of law: a monopolistic 
trader which had arisen to facilitate trade in the absence of the rule of law might obstruct its 
development to protect its monopoly rents. That this is a serious problem can be seen in the 
capital markets of modern East Asian countries, across which Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 
(2000, p.36) find strong negative correlations between the share of the fifteen largest families in 
market capitalization and indices of judicial efficiency and of the rule of law. Section 8 notes that 
the rule of law can also be obstructed by vested interests when each side of the market is 
dominated by a trading coalition. Section 9 summarizes our conclusions on the implications of 
trade for institutional development.  
1. The Traders 
  Our model of international trade distinguishes between:  
(i) the domestic zone of each of the two countries, where the goods to be traded internationally 
can be bought or sold at a fixed price by a resident of that country; 
(ii) the trading zone, where buyers and sellers from the two countries meet to trade. This could be 
located in either country or in a third location. Traders must incur trading costs to enter this zone. 
The following description of traders uses demand and supply curves to summarize the 
implications of the distribution of trading costs across traders. Throughout, we assume risk 
neutral traders. Our convention is that, except for ￿d￿ and ￿s￿ which denote demand and supply,  
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if a letter is used to denote a variable associated with buyers, then the next letter of the alphabet 
denotes the corresponding variable for sellers. 
  All buyers can buy or sell the good in their domestic zone at price b, but they differ in the 
cost t of entering the trading zone.2 At market price p, let d(p) be the number of buyers with 
trading cost t such that p ≤ b ￿ t, so that they find it worthwhile buying from foreigners. d(p) 
defines the trading demand curve D. The height p of D when demand is d equals the marginal 
buyer￿s gross revenue per unit b, less his trading cost t(d), i.e., p = b ￿ t(d) when d = d(p). 
  All sellers can buy or sell a unit of the good in their domestic zone at cost c, but they differ in 
the cost u of entering the trading zone. At price p, let s(p) be the number of sellers with trading 
cost u such that p ≥ c + u, so that they gain from selling to foreigners. s(p) defines the trading 
supply curve S. The height p of S when supply is s equals the total costs of the marginal seller 
with trading cost u(s), i.e., p = c + u(s) when s = s(p). 
  To relate the demand and supply elasticities to the distribution of trading costs across traders, 
let t0 be the trading cost of the least-cost buyer. Let F(τ ) be the number of buyers whose trading 
costs exceed t0 by no more than τ , so that they would buy at a price which ensured gross profits 
(i.e., profits before subtracting trading costs) of b - p > τ + t0.   To simplify exposition, we assume 
that the number of buyers is large enough to be represented by a continuous variable and that the 
distribution of trading costs is smooth enough that F(τ ) has a positive derivative in the interior of 
its support. The number of buyers at price p is d(p) = F(b-t0 - p), so the demand elasticity is: 
(1)   - pdp(p)/d(p) = pFτ /F = κ p/ (b - t0 - p)  
where differentiation with respect to a variable is indicated by a subscript and κ ≡ τ Fτ /F is the 
elasticity of F(τ ) with respect to τ . If κ (τ ) =  1 for 0 ≤ τ  ≤ τ 1, then trading costs have a uniform 
distribution over this interval: each 1% increase in trading costs in excess of the minimum t0 
leads to a 1% increase in the number of buyers. 
                                                 
2   For simplicity, trade is assumed to be otherwise secure. The sunk costs are thus understood to include defensive 
expenditure to prevent theft by traders from the other side of the market.  
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  Similarly, let u0 be the trading cost of the lowest-cost seller. The number G(τ ) of sellers 
whose trading costs exceed u0 by no more than τ  is also assumed to have a positive derivative in 
the interior of its support. Let λ  be the elasticity of G(τ ) with respect to τ.  The number of sellers 
at price p is s(p) = G(p - u0 - c), so the supply elasticity is: 
(2)   psp(p)/s(p) = pGτ /G = λ p/ (p - u0 - c) 
2. The Trading Mechanism Under the Rule of Law,  
  We distinguish between (a) the negotiating period when trades can be negotiated between 
traders from different countries who can costlessly recontract and (b) the trading period when the 
trades are executed by traders who incur trading costs to enter the trading zone. During the 
negotiating period, traders freely recontract until the best alternative price for a seller equals the 
best alternative price for a buyer, these being the prices for the marginal buyer and seller 
respectively. Thus, the equilibrium price pe is determined by the intersection of the demand and 
supply curves: 
   d(pe) = s(pe).  
We shall suppose that b - t0 > c + u0, so that there is an equilibrium price pe at which trade takes 
place and yields positive profits to inframarginal buyers and sellers. This price maximizes the 
aggregate profits of sellers and buyers. The profit of an active seller with selling cost u is pe - u - 
c. The profit of an active buyer with buying cost t is b - pe - t. 
  After traders have completed negotiations and contracted to trade at the equilibrium price pe, 
they incur trading costs to enter the trading zone. The rule of law requires traders who default to 
pay a penalty equal to their partner￿s trading cost. In principle, traders could default and 
renegotiate the contract during the trading period, but, in equilibrium, renegotiation never pays; 
the penalty deters default.  Thus, 
when traders incur trading costs, the rule of law prevents traders from converting a competitive 
situation in the negotiating period into one of bilateral monopoly in the trading period, where  
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they could exploit their more favorable default options and/or greater tolerance of bargaining 
delays. This point is highlighted by the following model of trade in the absence of the rule of law. 
3. The Trading Mechanism Without the Rule of Law  
  Without the rule of law, there is no point to negotiating before entering the trading zone: the 
negotiated agreements cannot be enforced. Thus, negotiation takes place only after traders have 
incurred trading costs. Sellers who enter the trading zone are then matched with buyers by a 
random process during the trading period. If there are more sellers than buyers in the zone, then 
each buyer is matched just once with a seller, whereas a seller’s probability of matching just once 
with a buyer equals the ratio of buyers to sellers in the trading zone. Reverse remarks apply if 
there are more buyers than sellers.3 
  The price p* emerging from a negotiation between a buyer and a seller who have been 
matched within the trading zone depends on:  
(i) the seller￿s bargaining power ω  relative to the buyer￿s bargaining power 1-ω ;  
(ii) their default options were they to walk away with no trade.  
We assume that the default options are independent of the trader’s trading costs, which are fixed 
at the time of the negotiation. The seller’s default option is to sell the good back into his domestic 
zone at price c; the buyer’s default option is to buy the good in his domestic zone at the price b. 
For example, p* could be modelled by the Nash bargaining price: 
(3)   p*(ω ,b,c) = ω b + (1-ω )c 
which solves:         
  
max
p  (p - c) ω (b - p)1-ω  
  Since b > c, p* is high if sellers are powerful relative to buyers, so that they can extract a high 
price which leaves buyers with little net benefit. However, at this high price, there may be few 
buyers willing to trade, so that not all active sellers achieve a sale. The reverse problem arises for 
                                                 
3   We reduce search to a matching model for simplicity. Ongoing search would have to be analyzed simultaneously 
with the alternative of continued bargaining.   
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buyers if they are relatively powerful. If there are more sellers than buyers, then the probability π 
of a seller selling his unit is less than 1. In line with our rationale for the determination of the 
price p* under bargaining, we assume that a seller who pays c in his domestic zone to obtain a 
good for trade and fails to find a buyer can re-sell the good in his domestic zone for price c. 
Under this assumption, a seller bringing a unit into the trading zone at cost u has expected gross 
profit (p*-c)π and expected net profit (p*-c)π  - u = (p*-c)π  + c - u - c. This is the same as if he 
faced a certain price (p*-c)π  + c. Since sellers are risk neutral, the number of sellers who find 
trading profitable is given by the supply curve as s((p*-c)π  + c). An excess supply equilibrium 
arises under beliefs about π which are confirmed by the actual ratio of demand to supply, i.e., for 
a π* satisfying: 
(4)   π  = d(p*)/s((p*-c)π  + c).  
  If there are more buyers than sellers, then a buyer coming to the trading zone at cost t has a 
probability π < 1 of buying a unit at price p* and selling it for b. Its expected profit is (b - p*)π - t 
= b - t + (b - p*)π - b. This is the same as a buyer with trading cost t who faces a deterministic 
price b - (b - p*)π. An excess demand equilibrium arises under beliefs about π which are 
confirmed by the actual ratio of supply to demand, i.e., for a π* satisfying: 
(5)   π = s(p*)/d(b - (b - p*)π). 
In the Appendix, we prove:  
Proposition 1 (Existence of equilibrium under anarchy) 
(A) If p* > pe, then there is a unique anarchic excess supply equilibrium. 
(B) If p* < pe, then there is a unique anarchic excess demand equilibrium. 
(C) If p* = pe, then anarchy and the rule of law have the same outcome.  
  In an excess supply equilibrium at price p* (> pe) the expected gross profits per seller are: 
    y = (p* - c)π* = (p* - c)d(p*)/s((p* - c)π* + c) by (4) 
At price p*, aggregate seller’s gross profits are: 
(6)   Y(p*) ≡  (p* - c)d(p*) = ys(y + c)  
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Thus, aggregate gross profits equals y, the expected gross profits per seller, times the number of 
sellers s(y+c). Since ys(y + c) is increasing in y, the impact of p* on each seller’s expected gross 
profits y has the sign of its impact on aggregate profits Y(p*). If aggregate gross profits are 
concave in aggregate sales, then an increase in p* increases aggregate gross profits if and only if 
p* is less than the price ps that maximizes aggregate sellers￿ gross profits.  
  In an excess demand equilibrium at price p* (< pe) the expected gross profits per buyer are: 
    x = (b - p*)π* = (b - p*)s(p*)/d((p* - b)π* + b) by (5).  
Aggregate gross buyer’s profits at price p* are: 
(7)   X(p*) = (b - p*)s(p*) = xd(b - x) 
Thus, aggregate gross profits equals x, the expected gross profits per buyer, times the number of 
buyers d(b - x). Since xd(b - x) is increasing in x, the impact of p* on each buyer’s expected gross 
profits has the sign of its impact on aggregate profits X(p*). If aggregate gross profits are 
concave in total purchases, then an increase in p* increases aggregate gross profits if and only if 
p* is less than the price pb which maximizes aggregate buyer’s gross profits. We have proved: 
Proposition 2  
(A) In an excess supply equilibrium, an increase in sellers￿ bargaining power decreases expected 
gross profits per seller if and only if it decreases aggregate sellers’ gross profits. If aggregate 
sellers’ gross profits are concave in total sales, then this will be true if and only if p*> ps. 
(B) In an excess demand equilibrium, an increase in buyers￿ bargaining power decreases 
expected gross profits per buyer if and only if it decreases aggregate buyers’ gross profits. If 
aggregate buyers’ gross profits are concave in total purchases, then this will be true if and only if 
p* < pb. 
  A seller who extracts a high price p* in anarchic negotiation in excess supply equilibrium can 
see those benefits dissipated as other sellers crowd in to enjoy them also, thereby reducing his 
probability of selling, i.e., sellers exert a negative externality on each other. Proposition 2 shows 
that an increase in seller bargaining power is counter-productive when p* > ps, because the direct  
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benefits of an increase in the price are outweighed by the greater negative externalities which 
sellers, attracted by the higher price, exert on each other. This creates a need for institutions 
which can internalize these externalities. In Section 2, we saw that the rule of law achieves this 
by ensuring that the sellers adhere to agreements made during the negotiation period when 
markets clear. Later sections will consider monopolies which also serve to internalize the 
externalities, albeit at the cost of other inefficiencies. Similar conclusions hold for an excess 
demand equilibrium.  
4.  Rule of Law vs. Anarchy 
  The argument of this section is as follows. Active traders on the excess side of the market 
prefer a move from anarchy to the rule of law if this increases gross expected profits per trader. 
Proposition 3 points out that this can be inferred from the impact of the move on the aggregate 
gross profits of traders on that side of the market via the monotonic relationships (6) and (7) 
between expected gross profits per trader and aggregate gross profits. Proposition 4 infers that 
the move toward the rule of law will be preferred by all traders, given wide discrepancies in the 
bargaining power of buyers and sellers under anarchic trade. Proposition 5 replaces this 
requirement by restrictions on the prices ps and pb that maximize the aggregate gross profits of 
sellers and buyers. Proposition 6 relates these restrictions to hypotheses on the underlying 
distributions of trading costs across traders.  
Proposition 3  
(A) An anarchic excess supply equilibrium at price p* > pe is worse for each active seller than the 
rule of law if and only if aggregate sellers’ gross profits are lower at p* than at pe.  
(B) An anarchic excess demand equilibrium at price p* < pe is worse for each active buyer than 
the rule of law if and only if aggregate buyers’ gross profits are lower at p* than at pe. 
  At an excess supply equilibrium where p* is close to b - t0, d(p*) is close to 0, as are 
aggregate sellers’ gross profits (p* - c)d(p*) and the expected gross profits per seller. Therefore,  
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sellers who were active under the excess supply equilibrium are better off under the rule of law. 
The sellers who become active under the rule of law are also better off, as are buyers, who face 
lower prices. A similar argument holds for excess demand equilibria when p* is close to c + u0, 
leading to:  
Proposition 4: All traders prefer the rule of law to anarchy, not only when their bargaining 
power in anarchic negotiations is relatively low, but also when it is relatively high, i.e., whenever 
there are large discrepancies in bargaining power between buyers and sellers. 
  At an excess supply equilibrium, pe < p*, so if ps ≤ pe, and aggregate sellers’ gross profits are 
concave in aggregate sales, then aggregate sellers’ gross profits are higher at pe than at p*. 
Proposition 3A now implies that all sellers who are active under the anarchy prefer the rule of 
law. Clearly, so do sellers who would be inactive under anarchy. Buyers are always better off 
under the rule of law when pe < p*. Thus, the condition ps ≤ pe is sufficient to ensure that all 
traders prefer the rule of law to any excess supply equilibrium. 
  To show that the condition ps ≤ pe is necessary for this conclusion when aggregate sellers’ 
gross profits are concave in aggregate sales, suppose that it does not hold, i.e., that pe < ps. Then 
for p* such that pe < p* ≤ p s,  aggregate sellers’ profits are higher under the excess supply 
equilibrium than under the rule of law.4 Proposition 3A now implies that active sellers would 
prefer the excess supply equilibrium to the rule of law. Thus, if the condition ps ≤ pe is violated, 
then there exists an excess supply equilibrium which some traders prefer to the rule of law. We 
have proved part (A) of the following proposition. The proof of (B) is similar. 
Proposition 5: Suppose that aggregate sellers’ gross profits are concave in aggregate sales and 
aggregate buyers’ gross profits are concave in aggregate purchases. 
                                                 
4 For  p* > ps, further analysis is required to rank aggregate sellers’ profits under the excess supply equilibrium and 
under the rule of law. However, our conclusion requires only that we establish that aggregate sellers’ profits are 
higher for some excess supply equilibria, i.e., for some values of p* > pe.  
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(A) All traders prefer the rule of law to any excess supply equilibrium if and only if ps ≤ pe. 
(B) All traders prefer the rule of law to any excess demand equilibrium if and only if pe ≤ pb. 
Consequently, all traders prefer the rule of law to any anarchic equilibrium which results in a 
price which differs from the competitive price under the rule of law if and only if ps ≤ pe ≤ pb.  
  The following Lemma (proven in the Appendix) shows that the requisite curvature conditions 
on aggregate gross profits hold, for example, if κ (τ ) and λ (τ ) are non-increasing in τ . 
Lemma 1: (A) Aggregate sellers’ gross profits are concave in aggregate sales if and only if:  
   1+  κ > τκ τ /κ   
(B) Aggregate buyers’ gross profits are concave in aggregate purchases if and only if: 
     l + λ > τλ τ /λ .  
  We next relate pe, ps and pb to structural parameters. Consider the number of buyers when 
they pay a margin τ  below the price b - t0 required to attract the minimum-cost buyer. Let γ (τ ) be 
the factor by which τ  must be increased to attract an equal number of sellers by offering them a 
margin g(τ ) ≡  τγ (τ ) over the price c + u0 required to attract the minimum-cost seller, i.e.: 
(8)   F(τ ) = G(g(τ )) = G(τγ (τ )) 
For example, if γ (τ ) is a constant over the support of F(.), then the distributions of buyers￿ and 
sellers’ trading costs differ only by a location and a scale parameter (e.g., both distributions are 
uniform). The equilibrium price pe under the rule of law ensures price margins for buyers and 
sellers which attract equal numbers so: 
   p e - u0 - c = g(b - t0 - pe) = (b - t0 - pe)γ (b - t0 - pe))  
 (9)   pe = 
(b - t0)γ e + c + u0
1 + γ e   for γ e ≡  γ (b - t0 - pe)  
Thus, under the rule of law, the equilibrium price incorporates the trading costs of buyers and 
sellers: the locations of the cost distributions are incorporated via the parameters u0 and t0; their 
relative spreads via the parameter γ e. By contrast, the outcome (3) of anarchic Nash bargaining: 
   p*  =  ω b + (1-ω )c  
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incorporates only the default values b and c of the traded good to buyers and sellers.  
 p s is determined by the first-order condition: 
    0 = Yp(p) = d + (p - c)dp(p) = d(p){1 - κ (p - c)/ (b - t0 ￿ p)} by (1) 
so:  
(10) ps = 
κ
sc + b− t0
1+ κ
s where κ s ≡  κ (ps - c - u0) 
u0 and γ e have a positive impact on the expression (9) for pe, but do not appear in the expression 
(10) for ps, whereas κ s has a negative impact on the expression (10) for ps, but does not appear in 
(9). Consequently, ps ≤ pe if κ s, u0 and/or γ e are sufficiently large for given values of the other 
parameters.  Similar remarks apply to the comparison of pe with: 
(11) pb = 
λ bb + c + u0
1 + λ b   where λ b ≡  λ (b - t0 - pb) 
Clean rankings of pe against ps and pb can be stated in terms of: 
   γ s ≡  γ (b - t0 - ps) and γ b ≡  γ (pb - c - u0) 
i.e.,  the ratio of the seller’s to the buyer’s required price margin when buyers face respectively the 
price ps which maximizes sellers’ aggregate gross profits and the price pb which maximizes 
buyers￿ aggregate gross profits. In the Appendix, we prove: 
Proposition 6: Suppose that the hypotheses of Lemma 1 hold, so that aggregate sellers’ profits 
are concave in aggregate sales and aggregate buyers’ profits are concave in aggregate purchases. 
(A) ps ≤ pe, so that all traders prefer the rule of law to all excess supply equilibria, if and only if: 
(12) 
u0












b - c - u0







Consequently, all traders prefer the rule of law to anarchy, whatever the balance of anarchic 
bargaining power, if and only if both (12) and (13) hold.  
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  Thus, all traders always prefer the rule of law if trading costs are high relative to the gross 
gains from trade, b ￿ c, and the traders that would be stronger in anarchic bargaining (so that they 
end up on the excess side of the market) are highly elastic to price margins and/or they require 
absolute price margins which are large relative to those required by the weaker side. Although 
the move to the rule of law may well yield considerable efficiency gains in these circumstances, 
this is not why it would be preferred by the stronger side. Instead, the rationale in the case of 
strong sellers (excess supply equilibria), for example, is that highly elastic supply and/or a high 
ratio of the sellers￿ to the buyers￿ required price margin would imply excess demand at the price 
ps which maximizes sellers￿ aggregate gross profits, so market forces under the rule of law would 
drive the equilibrium price pe above ps. Anarchic bargaining by strong sellers would drive the 
price even higher, lowering their aggregate gross profits, hence net expected profits per seller. 
Therefore, sellers would benefit from the the rule of law, which restrains anarchic bargaining. 
  To see how onerous are the conditions (12) and (13), consider the case where the buying and 
selling costs are each uniformly distributed, resulting in linear demand and supply curves. 
Then κ s = λ b = 1 and γ  is a constant, equal to the ratio of the absolute slopes of the supply and 
demand curves. (12) and (13) would hold, whatever the trading costs, if γ  ≡  1, so that the demand 
and supply curves have the same absolute slope. (12) and (13) would also hold, whatever the 
slopes of the demand and supply curves, if u0, t0 > b ￿ c - u0 - t0, i.e., the trading costs of the 
least-cost traders exceed their net gains from trade. The closer the absolute slopes of the demand 
and supply curves, the wider the acceptable range of trading costs. For example, if γ = 3,  then it 
suffices if the minimum buying cost exceeds half the net gains from trade between the minimum-
cost traders; γ = 2,  then it suffices if the minimum buying cost exceeds one-third of their net 
gains from trade.5 
                                                 
5   (12) is automatically satisfied in these circumstances, so we only have to address (13).  
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5. Monopolistic Middleman 
  The rule of law requires large-scale institutional changes: smaller-scale institutions may arise 
in its absence and reap some of the gains from trade. A monopolistic middleman provides an 
individualistic solution to the problem of holdup, requiring only that one agent have the resources 
to build and sustain a monopoly position.6 In our model, the middleman incurs a cost V to enter 
the trading zone with monopoly power, but thereafter a zero marginal cost to meet another 
atomistic trader, an assumption which would be reasonable if the trading zone were small. The 
middleman meets in turn each seller in the zone to negotiate the price that it pays, then meets in 
turn each buyer in the zone to negotiate the price which it charges. The middleman￿s default 
option in any negotiation is to trade with another atomistic trader. 
  For the middleman to address the holdup problem, atomistic traders must believe that it will 
not hold them up after they have entered the trading zone. This would be true in the following 
case: 
(A) Traders can return to anarchic trade, even after they have entered the trading zone.  
In this case, the middleman could credibly announce that it will trade at the prices which 
maximize its profits subject to the constraint that atomistic traders on at least one side of the 
market have no incentive to return to anarchic trade. The details of the middleman￿s profit-
maximizing policy in these circumstances are relegated to Proposition 14 in the Appendix. Let 
MB be the highest profits that the middleman can achieve and let SB be the quantity that it trades.  
  Holdup by the middleman would be possible if it were difficult for the atomistic traders to 
co-ordinate a joint return to anarchic trade, leaving each with no option but to trade with the 
middleman once they have entered the trading zone. This situation is captured by the following 
assumption:  
                                                 
6  For historical counterparts, see Fernand Braudel (1979), especially p.320 on the putting out system, and p. 412 - 
419 ’Competition Without Competitors’. p.413 points out that monopolistic middlemen arose "in response to the 
heavy regulation of public trade which was aimed at preserving fair competition in the market and the interest of 
the urban consumer." In our terms, they arose in response to the costs of operating the rule of law.  
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(B) Traders must choose between trading with the middleman and trading anarchically before 
they enter the trading zone. 
  In this case, if the middleman had only a one-period horizon, then it would announce the 
prices which would maximize its one-period profits subject to the constraint that atomistic 
traders on at least one side of the market have no incentive to choose anarchic trade, i.e., the 
same prices as in case (A). However, after the atomistic traders had entered the trading zone, its 
optimal policy would be to set prices equal to their default options, thereby garnering operating 
profits (i.e., profits before deducting its cost of entering the trading zone): 
    (b - c)SB > MB 
Thus, in a one-period game, the middleman’s price announcements at the beginning of the period 
would not be credible. We therefore suppose that the one-period game is repeated over an infinite 
horizon and that if the middleman violates the prices it announced at the beginning of any period, 
then the atomistic traders would never deal with the middleman in subsequent periods (for fear 
that they would again be held up). Anticipating this response, the middleman would honour its 
announced prices, provided that the present value of the resulting operating profit stream exceeds 
its operating profits from holding up traders in the current period, i.e., provided that: 
(16) MB/(1 - ∆ ) > (b - c)SB  
where ∆  is the middleman’s discount factor. Moreover, the middleman can make a net profit after 
incurring the fixed cost V of entering the trading zone, provided that: 
(17) MB/(1 - ∆ ) > V. 
We have proved:  
Proposition 7. Under assumption (B) above, suppose that p* ≠ pe and (16) and (17) hold. Then 
there is an equilibrium of the infinite-horizon repeated game in which traders trade through the 
middleman and it honors the prices that it announces at the beginning of each period, which are 
the prices that would maximize its profits under assumption (A).   
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  The atomistic traders might find it difficult to determine whether condition (16) was satisfied, 
i.e., whether the middleman would honour its announced prices out of self-interest. For example, 
traders might find it difficult to estimate its discount factor ∆ . However, even limited information 
might permit the traders to judge that: 
(18)  (b - c)SB < V 
i.e., that the middleman’s fixed cost V of entering the trading zone is larger than its one-period 
operating profits from holding up all the traders. In that case, the traders could conclude that the 
middleman would have entered only if (17) held, from which (16) can then be inferred. Thus, the 
middleman’s own fixed cost of entering the zone can make its price announcements credible: 
traders would judge that large fixed costs can be recouped only by staying in business over many 
periods, which requires the middleman not to damage its reputation by holdup attempts. 
  These considerations throw some light on the relationship between monopolies and the state. 
Although monopoly is the traditional villain in microeconomic analyses that implicitly assume 
the rule of law, history records many examples of the state sanctioning a monopoly, by granting 
or selling it a charter. One reason for this, suggested by our analysis, is that monopolies 
addressed the holdup problem at a lower overhead cost to the state than setting up a legal system. 
In terms of our model, state sanction reduces the cost V of entering the trading zone as a 
middleman with monopoly power, facilitating the satisfaction of condition (17). If state support 
drives V substantially below than MB/(1 - ∆ ), then the state could extract some of the monopoly 
profits by selling the monopoly charter for H where V+H < MB/(1-∆ ). Our analysis reveals 
another reason for the state to do this: by driving up the total cost of entry so that both (18) and 
(17) were satisfied when V is replaced by V+H, the state could not only extract revenue but could 
also reinforce the credibility of the monopolist’s commitment to refrain from holdup. The state 
could also do this directly by writing in and enforcing an anti-holdup provision in the monopoly 
charter itself. 
  To summarize, in the absence of the rule of law, a monopolistic middleman addresses the 
holdup problem in two ways:  
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(i) It internalizes the externalities that its atomistic counterparts on each side of the market would 
have inflicted on each other by crowding in to pursue the benefits of anarchic holdup.  
(ii) By having a corporate identity and interests which extend beyond one period, as evinced by 
incurring the fixed cost of entering the trading zone with monopoly power, it facilitates trade by 
making a credible commitment to refrain from holding up atomistic traders. 
  Although state sanction of monopolistic middlemen can address the holdup problem at a 
lower overhead cost than setting up a legal system, this parsimony has a downside: the 
deadweight loss due to the exercise of monopoly power. A profitable middleman must offer 
sellers a price lower than pe, for otherwise it could dispose of its purchases only at a loss. The 
profitable middleman must also offer buyers a price higher than pe for otherwise it could meet 
their demands only by purchasing at a loss. We therefore have:  
Proposition 8. All atomistic traders prefer direct trade under the rule of law to trading through 
the middleman. 
  Since the evolution of the rule of law would permit atomistic traders to bypass the 
middleman and erode its profits, the middleman has a vested interest in hampering that 
evolution. Atomistic traders would gain more than the middleman loses so, in principle, they 
could muster more resources to support the rule of law, but they would face free rider problems 
in so doing. 
5. Trading Coalitions 
  The holdup problem can also be addressed by a coalition of the traders on one side of the 
market who build social and economic ties to form a collective monopoly, possibly facilitated by 
a state monopoly grant. Its members refrain from holdup in their collective self-interest, while 
using collective action to guard against holdup by counter-parties. The coalition trading 
mechanism is as follows. Individual traders have the same costs as before. Buyers jointly incur a 
fixed cost v to form a coalition, which thereafter incurs a zero marginal cost to meet each  
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atomistic seller in turn to negotiate a price. Like the monopolistic middleman, the buyer coalition 
can set a price unilaterally in negotiations in the trading zone.  
  Suppose that the buyer coalition credibly announces the price that it shall offer to sellers, 
thereby attracting into the zone all sellers who would find trade profitable at that price. Its 
aggregate cost of buying s units is T(s) ≡  ∫
s
0  t(d’)dd’ where t(d￿) is the trading cost of the marginal 
buyer when total demand is d￿. When total supply is s, the buyer coalition pays c+ u(s) per unit, 
where u(s) is the trading cost of the marginal seller. Therefore aggregate buyers’ operating profits 
(i.e., profits before deducting the cost of forming the coalition) are: 
   m(s)  ≡  bs - T(s) - (c + u(s))s 
Since Ts(s) = t(s), the first order condition determining the buyer coalition’s choice of s = sB is: 
(19)  b - t(s) = c + u(s) + sus(s) 
Sellers receive a price that yields zero profits to the marginal seller: 
(20) qB = c + u(sB) 
This is given by the point on the supply curve S below the intersection of the marginal revenue 
curve of the buyer coalition (which coincides with the demand curve D of atomistic buyers) and 
the marginal cost curve MC facing the buyer coalition (which is to the left of the supply curve S 
facing atomistic buyers). The equilibrium price pe under the rule of law is determined by the 
intersection of D and S so:  
   q B < pe 
In the Appendix, we prove:  
Proposition 9: A buyer coalition faces atomistic sellers and can credibly announce a price to 
sellers which maximizes its aggregate profits.  
(A) The buyer coalition secures higher operating profits than under an anarchic equilibrium.  
(B) The atomistic sellers secure higher profits than under anarchic negotiations that lead to a 
price p* which is either very low or very high.   
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(C) The atomistic sellers secure lower profits than under anarchic negotiations that lead to values 
of p* in the neighborhood of pe. 
  However, if the buyer coalition had only a one-period horizon, then after the atomistic sellers 
had incurred the costs of entering the zone, its optimal policy would be to hold each of them up 
by setting a price equal to their default option c, thereby securing higher profits than if it honored 
its announcements: 
    (b - c)sB - T(sB) > bsB - T(sB) - (c + u(sB))sB =  m(sB) 
Thus, the buyer coalition￿s announcement of qB would not be credible in a one-period model.7 
Therefore, we suppose that traders anticipate that the above one-period game will be repeated 
over an infinite horizon and that buyer violations of the price announcement in any period cause 
sellers to refrain from re-entering the trading zone in subsequent periods. Then the buyer 
coalition would honor its announced prices if the present value of the resulting operating profit 
stream exceeds its operating profits from holding up traders in the current period, i.e., if: 
(21) m(sB)/(1 - δ ) > (b - c)sB - T(sB)  
where δ  is the buyer coalition’s discount factor.  
  The buyer coalition will secure a higher present value of net profits, after incurring the fixed 
cost v of coalition formation, provided that: 
(22) m(sB)/(1 - δ ) - v > m*/(1 - δ ) 
where m* is the aggregate net profits of buyers under anarchy. Proposition 9A implies that this 
will always hold when v is sufficiently low. Thus, we have: 
Proposition 10: In the infinite-horizon repeated game, suppose that (21) and (22) hold. Then 
there is an equilibrium in which the buyer coalition honors its announcement at the beginning of 
each period to pay sellers qB.  
Section 5￿s comments on the roles of the state and of the monopolist￿s fixed costs in making its 
                                                 
7   There is no counterpart to the middleman case (A), since held up sellers cannot revert to anarchic trade so long 
as the buyer coalition maintains cohesion.  
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announcements credible apply also to the trading coalition.  
  We next compare the rule of law with the outcome when a trading coalition is price leader. 
When the buyer coalition is price leader, its profits m(s) are higher at the level sB  which 
maximizes m(s) than at s = s(pe). Each seller receives a price qB < pe, so its profits are lower. A 
similar argument holds when the seller coalition is the price leader. We have proved: 
Proposition 11: A coalition which is the price leader of atomistic traders secures profits which 
are higher than under the rule of law, while the atomistic traders secure profits which are lower. 
  Thus, the formation of a trader coalition to address the inefficiencies of anarchic trade can 
leave a damaging legacy: the coalition would seek to retain its monopoly rents by maintaining the 
cohesion originally necessitated by the absence of the rule of law. Indeed, it would be motivated 
to resist the evolution of the rule of law because this would facilitate individualistic trade and 
undermine coalition cohesion. 
7. Bilateral Monopoly of Trading Coalitions 
  Tracy (1991, p.19) reports intriguing behaviour by two leading trading coalitions from 
history, the East India Companies of Britain and the Netherlands. They typically sought exclusive 
trading agreements with local princes who were given some military power. In terms of our 
model, the buyer coalition fostered a seller coalition. Why? 
  One reason may have been that, although refraining from holdup could have been in the 
buyer coalition’s long-term interests, as discussed above, this point could have been lost on 
sellers unversed in strategic commercial calculations. Then the buyer coalition might seek to 
attract sellers by strengthening their bargaining position under the feared holdup by fostering a 
seller coalition which could depart collectively from the trading zone. In any reasonable model of 
direct bargaining between the two coalitions, there will be a range of parameters such that both 
would emerge with positive profits, i.e., such that a buyer coalition that could not otherwise make 




   A second reason for fostering a seller coalition is that, in a dispersed trading zone, such as 
that faced by the East India Companies, the buyer coalition could face a positive marginal cost of 
finding another atomistic seller in the zone, even after incurring the cost of entering the zone, 
leaving its local representative vulnerable to holdup by sellers ￿ effectively a return to anarchic 
negotiations. This situation could be modelled by reverting to the assumption that a buyer 
(coalition) can meet only one seller each time it incurs the cost of entering the trading zone, so 
that one-on-one encounters between buyer and sellers result in anarchic negotiations which lead 
to the price p*. In these circumstances, the buyer coalition might foster a seller coalition that 
would constrain its members from individual holdup attempts out of collective self interest. The 
seller coalition could do so, however, only if the buyer coalition’s policy left sellers better off 
than under the anarchy to which sellers could unilaterally force a return. Such a buyer policy can 
always be found because the two coalitions can share in the gains from internalizing the negative 
externalities amongst the traders on the side of the market which would be crowded in an 
anarchic equilibrium. In the Appendix, we prove:  
Proposition 12. Suppose that a coalition controlling buyer entry into the trading zone fosters a 
coalition which controls seller entry and accepts the buyer coalition’s price leadership. Then the 
buyer coalition can set a price which ensures that the aggregate expected operating profits of both 
coalitions are higher than under anarchy which leads to p* ≠ pe. 
8. Collective Bargaining Between Trading Coalitions 
  In a bilateral monopoly of trading coalitions, the price follower might aspire to price 
leadership. The ensuing struggle could be modelled as direct Nash bargaining between the 
coalitions, which we assume to involve the volume traded, as well as the price. The profits of the 
buyer and the seller coalitions are: 
                                                 
8   In a similar vein Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994, p. p.772-3) argue that medieval rulers in Europe may have 
fostered coalitions of foreign merchants to make credible a commitment to secure their trading rights.  
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   Ι (S,P) ≡  bS - T(S) ￿ PS - v and J(P,S) ≡  PS - cS - U(S) - w 
where U(s) ≡  ∫s
0  u(s’)ds’ is the aggregate cost of selling s units and v (w) is the cost of forming 
the buyer (seller) coalition. We assume that their default options if no agreement is reached are 
zero. The outcome (S*,P*) of Nash bargaining between the coalitions is the solution to: 
   max
(S,P) Ι (S,P)1-Ω  J(P,S)Ω  
where the constant Ω  (0 < Ω  < 1) parametrizes the bargaining power of the buyer coalition. In the 
Appendix, we prove: 
Proposition 13: Collective Nash bargaining leads to the same volume of trade S
e
 as the rule of 















  This result sharply illustrates the difficulties in the approach to the rule of law through 
intermediate ￿private￿ institutions. Collective bargaining leads to the volume of trade that 
maximizes aggregate profits, leaving no efficiency gains to smooth the transition toward the rule 
of law. This transition would generally change the division of profits, so it would be opposed by 
the losing coalition. Proposition 13 shows that collective bargaining would reproduce the 
outcome of the rule of law only if a coalition￿s relative bargaining power equals its relative share 
of profits under the rule of law. This would occur only if the coalitions were equally effective at 
taxing their members￿ profits and translating the proceeds into bargaining power. Contrariwise, 
differences in effectiveness would lead to a bargaining equilibrium where one coalition would 
block the move toward the rule of law. Thus, the formation of trading coalitions in response to 
the inefficiencies of anarchic bargaining could lead into an historical cul de sac which long 
delays the rule of law. 
9. Conclusions 
  ￿Trade implies law￿ because the gains from trade give the side which would be weaker in  
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anarchic bargaining some leverage on the development of institutions. The rule of law to protect 
the weak could arise, not from the benevolence of the strong, but from their self interest. We 
established necessary and sufficient conditions for a move from anarchy toward the rule of law to 
be preferred by all traders, even those that would be stronger in anarchic bargaining. These 
conditions, stated in terms of the parameters describing the distribution of trading costs across 
traders, are not onerous. One explanation for the slow emergence of the rule of law might be the 
difficulties of setting up legal institutions. Another, suggested by our analysis, is that the 
monopolistic traders that emerge to address more quickly the inefficiencies of anarchic trade 
have a vested interest in impeding the rule of law.  
  We argued that a monopolistic trader can substitute for the rule of law only if atomistic 
traders have some guarantee against holdup, such as: the option of an immediate return to 
anarchic trade; a collective organization to redress perceived inbalances in bargaining power, 
perhaps fostered by the monopolistic trader itself; fixed costs of the monopolistic trader which it 
could not recoup if it attempted holdup; or the threat of withdrawal of government sanction of 
their monopoly. Thus, these private substitutes for the rule of law also illustrate, in a more 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1 
  If p* > pe, then d(p*) < s(p*) so, as π approaches 1, s((p*-c)π  + c) approaches s(p*) and 
d(p*)/s((p*-c)π  + c) approaches d(p*)/s(p*) < 1. As π approaches 0, s((p*-c)π  + c) approaches 0, 
so d(p*)/s((p*-c)π  + c) becomes very large. Since d(p*)/s((p*-c)π  + c) - π   is negative for π close 
to 1 and is positive for π close to 0, Rolle￿s Theorem implies that there exists a π* satisfying (4) 
such that 0 < π* < 1. This π* is unique because d(p*)/s((p*-c)π  + c) - π  is monotonically 
decreasing in π. Since π* < 1, d(p*) < s((p*-c)π  + c), so π* indeed defines an excess supply 
equilibrium. This proves (A). The proof of (B) is similar. Regarding (C), note that if p* = pe, then 
d(p*) = s(p*) = s(p*π*) for π* = 1, so anarchy leads to the same outcomes as the rule of law.   
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Proof of Lemma 1 
  (A) The price p(d) which leads to demand d is defined implicitly by: 
(A1)  d = F(b ￿ p(d) ￿ t0) 
The marginal revenue from aggregate sales d is p(d)+dpd(d), so aggregate sellers￿ gross profits 
p(d)d ￿ cd are concave in d if and only if:  
(A2)  0 > 2pd + dpdd 
To relate the derivatives of p(d) and F(τ ), differentiate (A1) with respect to d: 
(A3)  1 = -Fτ (b ￿ p ￿ t0)pd = -κ F(τ )pd/τ 
Differentiating (A3) logarithmically with respect to τ =  b ￿ p ￿ t0 and noting that dτ  = Fτ :   
(A4) 0  =  τκ τ /κ  + κ  - 1 + τ Fτ pdd/pd = τκ τ /κ + κ  - 1 + κ dpdd/pd  
(A2) holds if and only if dpdd/pd < -2 or: 
 τ κ τ /κ  < 1+ κ 
The proof of part (B) is similar. 
Proof of Proposition 6 
  (A) Since Fτ  > 0 and Gτ  > 0, (8) implies that gτ  > 0. Consequently, pe ≥ ps is equivalent to: 
  c + u0 = pe ￿ g(b ￿ t0 ￿ pe) ≥ ps ￿ g(b ￿ t0 ￿ ps) =  
cκ s + b - t0
1 + κ s   - g(b ￿ t0 ￿ 
cκ s + b - t0
1 + κ s  ) 
   u 0 ≥ 
b - c - t0
1 + κ s   - g(κ s 
b - c - t0




b - c - t0
  ≥ 
1 - γ sκ s
1 + κ s   which can be rearranged as (12).  
The conclusion now follows from Proposition 5A. The proof of (B) is similar. 
The Optimal Policy of the Monopolistic Middleman  
  If atomistic traders could not switch to anarchic trade, then the middleman would maximize 
profits by buying for resale the amount S
B which equates (i) the marginal revenue b ￿ t(s) ￿ sts 
from selling to the buyers and (ii) the marginal cost = c + s + sus of buying from the sellers. This 
would be achieved by the policy:  
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  (a) Sell at the price QB ≡  b ￿ t(SB); buy at the price RB ≡  c + u(SB). 
Under anarchic trade which leads to an excess supply equilibrium with price p* > p
e, each active 
buyer receives p*, while each active seller￿s expected revenue is (p*-c)π *  + c. If p* ≥ QB, then 
policy (a) would leave buyers with no incentive to switch to anarchic trade, precluding seller 
attempts at such trade, so at the price RB, sellers would supply the SB units demanded by buyers. 
If (p*-c)π *  + c ≤ R
B then policy (a) would leave sellers with no incentive to switch to anarchic 
trade, precluding buyer attempts at such trade, so at the price QB, buyers would buy the SB units 
sold by sellers. Thus, if either p* ≥ QB or (p*-c)π *  + c ≤ R
B, then the atomistic traders on at least 
one side of the market would not participate in anarchic trade and policy (a) would maximize the 
middleman￿s profits.   
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  Now suppose that R
B < (p*-c)π *  + c < p* < Q
B so that under policy (a) the atomistic traders 
on both sides of the market would switch to anarchic trade. Then the middleman￿s profit-
maximizing policy would be the more profitable of the following two policies: 
  (b) Sell at a price just below p*; buy at the price s-1(d(p*)). 
  (c) Buy at a price just above (p*-c)π *  + c; sell at the price d-1(s((p*-c)π *  + c)) 
where s-1(.) and d-1(.) are the inverse supply and demand functions. Policy (b) leaves buyers no 
incentive to switch to anarchic trade, precluding seller attempts at such trade, so at price s-
1(d(p*)), sellers would indeed supply the d(p*) units demanded by buyers. The middleman makes 
positive profits since s-1(d(p*)) < p*.  
  Policy (c) would leave sellers no incentive to switch to anarchic trade, precluding buyer 
attempts at such trade. Therefore, at the price d-1(s((p*-c)π *  + c)), buyers would indeed buy the 
s((p*-c)π *  + c) units offered by sellers. The middleman makes positive profits if and only if  
(p*-c)π *  + c < p
e since this ensures that s((p*-c)π *  + c) < d((p*-c)π *  + c) and d-1(s((p*-c)π *  + c) 
> (p*-c)π *  + c. Then, whether (b) or (c) yields higher profits would depend on the demand and 
supply elasticities. To summarize:  
Proposition 14: For the case p* > p
e, the middleman￿s profit-maximizing would be policy (a) if 
either p* ≥ Q B or (p*-c)π *  + c ≤ R
B.. Otherwise, the middleman would choose the more 
profitable of policies (b) or (c). This would be (b) if (p*-c)π *  + c > pe; otherwise the choice 
would depend on the demand and supply elasticities. Similar conclusions hold mutatis mutandis 
when p* < pe. 
Proof of Proposition 9 
  (A) Suppose that p* > pe so that s(p*) > d(p*) and:  
    p* = c+u(s(p*) > c+u(d(p*).  
Under anarchy, aggregate buyer profits are: 
m* = bd(p*) - T(d(p*)) - p*s(p*) < bd(p*) - T(d(p*)) - [c+u(d(p*))]d(p*) = m(d(p*)) ≤ m(sB) 
  Suppose that p* = pe so that s(p*) = d(p*). Under anarchy, aggregate buyer profits are:  
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m* = bd(p*) - T(d(p*)) - p*s(p*) = bd(p*) - T(d(p*)) - [c+u(d(p*))]d(p*) = m(d(pe)) < m(sB)  
  Suppose that p* < pe so that d(p*) > s(p*) and p* = c+u(s(p*)). Under anarchy, aggregate 
buyer profits are: 
m* = bs(p*) - T(d(p*)) - p*s(p*) = bs(p*) - T(s(p*)) - [c+u(s(p*))]s(p*) = m(s(p*)) ≤ m(sB)  
  (B) At a high p* close to b - t0, d(p*) is close to 0, as are aggregate sellers’ gross profits  
(p* - c)d(p*) and the expected gross profits per seller. On the other hand, when p* < qB, (20) 
implies that p* < pe, so anarchy leads to an excess demand equilibrium in which individual 
sellers receive a lower price (and achieve lower profits) than under price leadership by the buyer 
coalition.  
  (C) For p* satisfying qB < p* ≤ pe anarchy leads either to an excess demand equilibrium or to 
the competitive outcome under the rule of law. In either case, each seller sells its unit at a price 
p* which exceeds the price qB resulting from price leadership by the buyer coalition, so the 
sellers achieve higher profits under anarchy. This remains true for prices p* just above pe since 
the profits of individual sellers under an excess supply equilibrium are right continuous in p* at 
pe. This completes the proof of (C).  
Proof of Proposition 12 
  The sellers’ aggregate cost of supplying s units is: 
     C(s)  ≡  cs + U(s)  
If the buyer coalition sets price p, then, as price follower, the seller coalition chooses s such that: 
    p = Cs(s) = c + Us(s) = c + u(s) 
Thus, the seller coalition sells the same amount s(p) as atomistic sellers facing price p. 
  (A) Suppose that anarchy leads to a price p* < pe, i.e., an excess demand equilibrium. If the 
buyer coalition sets a price p*, then the seller coalition supplies s(p*) and sellers achieve the 
same operating profits as under anarchy. However, buyers enjoy higher operating profits: their 
gross operating profits are (b - p*)s(p*), which is the same as under anarchy (see (7)), but their 
trading costs T(s(p*)) are less than their trading costs T(d(p*)) under anarchy: they no longer  
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crowd into the market and exert a negative externality on each other. By setting a price just above 
p* the buyer coalition leaves both sides with higher operating profits than under anarchy. 
  (B) Suppose that anarchy leads to p* > pe, i.e., an excess supply equilibrium. If the buyer 
coalition sets the price (p* - c)π* + c, then gross operating profits per seller are (p* - c)π*, 
supplies are s((p* - c)π* + c) and aggregate sellers’ gross operating profits are: 
    (p* - c)π*s((p* - c)π* + c) = (p* - c)d(p*) 
Thus, at the price (p* - c)π* + c, sellers achieve the same expected sales as under anarchy and the 
same expected gross operating profits. However, they incur trading costs U(s((p* - c)π* + c)) that 
are less than their trading costs U(s(p*)) under anarchy: they no longer exert a negative 
externality on each other through oversupply. Thus, sellers would enjoy higher operating profits 
than under anarchy. The buyer coalition receives: 
    s((p* - c)π* + c) = d(p*)/π * > d(p*) 
i.e., it receives more than under anarchy, but pays less, so its operating profits are higher.9  
Proof of Proposition 13 
  The first-order conditions for (S*,P*) equate to 0 the derivatives of the maximand in (23) 
with respect to S and P: 
(A5) 
(1 −Ω ) {b− t(S*)− P*}
I(S*,P*)
=










Dividing (A5) by (A6): 
(A7)  b - t(S*) = c+ u(S*)  
Thus, S* = Se, so collective bargaining leads to the level of aggregate sales which is globally 
efficient, i.e., the same level as under the rule of law. Therefore, (A6) implies that: 
                                                 











The second part of Proposition 13 follows immediately. 